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Abstract 
This paper estimates the effects of employer labor market power on wage inequality in the United States. 
I find that inequality as measured by interdecile range is 23.7% higher in perfectly monopsonistic labor 
markets than in perfectly competitive markets, even when controlling for commuting zone and occupation 
fixed effects. I also decompose these results into 50/10 and 90/50 ratios, finding much larger impacts on 
inequality among low earners. These results suggest that monopsony power has significant and policy-
relevant impacts on wage inequality, and particularly harms the lowest earning subsets of the labor force. 
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1.  Introduction 
Important frictions are present in the labor market. As Manning (2003) points out, “people go to 
the pub to celebrate when they get a job rather than greeting the news with the shrug of the 
shoulders that we might expect if labour markets were frictionless… [and] go to the pub to drown 
their sorrows when they lose their job rather than picking up another one straight away.” And since 
at least Manning and Boal and Ransom (1997), there has been a strong theoretical grounding for 
the idea that labor market monopsony is an important source of those frictions. The impacts of 
monopsony are theoretically clear: greater monopsony leads to more unemployment and lower 
wages. More precisely, employers under monopsony face an upward-sloping labor supply curve, 
and if they are profit-maximizing, will choose to set wages and employment at levels lower than 
those present in perfect competition. This relationship is fundamentally exploitative: workers 
under monopsony conditions are underpaid relative to the value they create for the firm.  
Many recent empirical papers have attempted to quantify these claims, estimating the level of 
monopsony in specific labor markets and its impact on wages (e.g. Benmelech et al., 2020, 
Hershbein et al., 2019, Dube et al., 2020). Nearly all have found large and statistically significant 
negative impacts of monopsony power on wages, as suggested by theory, and provided evidence 
that an overwhelming share of U.S. labor markets exhibit at least some significant degree of 
monopsony. Yet despite this flood of recent research, very little empirical work has focused on 
how monopsony affects the wages of different subsets of the labor market in different ways or how 
monopsony creates and interacts with wage inequality. Understanding this issue is crucial for 
deriving appropriate policy responses, particularly in occupations and geographic areas which 
exhibit high levels of monopsony.  
This paper aims to fill part of this gap in the literature. I introduce a model for why inequality and 
monopsony might be causally linked, and test the predictions of this model using a combination 
of high-quality data on monopsony power for all commuting zones and occupations in the United 
States for the year 2016 and individual microdata from the American Community Survey. I find 
that increased monopsony power in a particular labor market is associated with a significant and 
policy-relevant increase in the level of wage inequality in that market. I further break down these 
results into estimates for the lower and higher ends of the income distribution, finding that 
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increased inequality is primarily a result of falling wages among the lowest earners in the labor 
force. These findings provide evidence that the dual trends in the modern American economy of 
increasing wage inequality and increasing market power may be causally linked. 
2. Contribution to the Literature 
There is a substantial literature on increasing market concentration and markups alongside the 
decline of the labor share of national income in the United States (e.g. Karabounis and Neiman 
2014, Autor et al. 2020, De Loecker et al. 2020). A related literature has documented the presence 
of employer labor market power in various markets and analyzed its wage effects under a variety 
of data sources, monopsony measures, and market definitions. Naidu et al. (2018) directly tie 
monopsony power to the falling labor share, estimating that high levels of monopsony reduce the 
labor share by as much as 22%, while Grullon et al. (2019) find that U.S. industries are becoming 
more concentrated over time and that this concentration results in higher profit margins but not 
increased operational efficiency. Azar et al. use online vacancies data to estimate concentration 
and wage effects and find that high concentration is associated with a significant decrease in hourly 
wages, particularly concerning given that more than 60% of U.S. labor markets are highly 
concentrated by their definition. Hershbein et al. (2019) use data from vacancies and total 
employment along with a variety of market definitions to calculate the wage effects of monopsony, 
finding that a 1% increase in local labor market concentration is associated with a 0.14% decrease 
in average hourly wages; Benmelech et al. (2020) find similar results and note that higher rates of 
unionization are associated with lower monopsony wage penalties. Perhaps the most surprising 
results come from Dube et al. (2020), who find that a substantial degree of monopsony power is 
present even in online labor markets with seemingly low switching and search costs. The authors 
suggest that based on these results, monopsony power is likely present in the vast majority of labor 
markets, even those which should theoretically be highly competitive. Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that monopsony power is a major factor in the modern American economy, and 
employer profit margins tend to be higher at the expense of workers in high-monopsony areas.   
The implications of monopsony theory are broader than just negative wage effects: monopsony 
theory has been used as a tool to explain issues from worker exploitation in professional sports 
(Kahn, 2000) to the small effects of minimum wages on employment relative to those expected in 
neoclassical theory (Dustmann et al., 2019). Manning (2020) provides a review of the modern 
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literature and its implications for a wide variety of topics. But despite all the recent interest in 
monopsony, there remains a paucity of studies on the effects of monopsony power on wage 
inequality. To the best of my knowledge, only two papers have attempted to directly quantify the 
relationships between monopsony and inequality. Webber (2015) uses data from the Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics to compute firm-level measures of monopsony power and 
analyzes their effects on the earnings distribution. He finds positive and statistically significant 
effects of employer labor market power on inequality, and that the negative impact of firm market 
power is strongest in the lower half of the earnings distribution. Rinz (2018) uses data from the 
Longitudinal Business Database and Form W-2 to calculate monopsony measures, finding 
somewhat idiosyncratic results on local market concentration. He finds modest but positive effects 
of labor market concentration on inequality and confirms the results in Webber on who is most 
affected, noting that earnings fall most at the bottom when concentration increases. Neither of 
these papers use data on vacancies, my preferred specification of the effective monopsony 
conditions facing workers.  
3. Model 
There is no immediately obvious reason to assume that monopsony would be associated with 
increased inequality. In its simplest form, monopsony theory simply posits that most employers 
face an upward-sloping labor supply curve. Under such conditions and assuming a Cournot model 
of oligopsony, a profit-maximizing firm faces the problem  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑅(𝐿) –  𝑤(𝐿 + 𝐿∗)𝐿                          (1) 
where L denotes employment for the particular firm, L* denotes employment for all other firms in 
the market, R(L) is revenue as a function of employment, and w(L+ L*) is the inverse labor supply 
function where wages are a function of employment. The monopsonistic firm pays workers less 
than their marginal revenue product (MRP), and this can be written as a firm-specific Pigouvian 






                               (2)  
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A more accurate way to model the firm’s problem under monopsony is allowing for differentiated 
workers of particular types, each contributing differently to revenue on the margin. With 
differentiated workers, the firm’s problem is similar but slightly distinct: 
 





                               (3)  
where Lt is employment for workers of type t, wt(Lt + 𝐿𝑡
∗) is the inverse labor supply function for 
workers of type t, and T is the number of distinct types of workers. For each type of worker, our 
profit-maximizing firm faces a different choice: they must set employment and wages equal to the 
profit-maximizing level for that particular type, which will differ depending on the characteristics 
of workers of that type, including their propensity to quit. The inverse labor supply function 
𝑤𝑡(𝐿𝑡 +  𝐿𝑡








                               (4)  
The fact that the rate of exploitation can vary based on worker type is a crucial insight which allows 
us to model the inequality effects of monopsony. Ceteris paribus, if the rate of exploitation 
increases faster on average for low-wage workers than high-wage workers as monopsony 
increases, then monopsony power will tend to result in greater wage inequality. There are a number 
of reasons to believe that this might be the case, particularly in the United States. If we incorporate 
the ability of workers to quit their jobs to the model of exploitation in equation (4), and define a 
set of high-wage workers and low-wage workers (for which the cutoffs are largely arbitrary, except 
that the sets must not overlap and all high-wage workers must earn more than the highest-earning 










                               (5)  
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where the average quit rate ?̅?ℎ𝑤 at a given wage is a function of various characteristics associated 
with the group of high-wage workers. The average rate of exploitation for low-wage workers will 
look essentially the same: 
 
?̅?𝑙𝑤 =






                            (6)  
It is intuitively clear that the average quit rates ?̅?𝑙𝑤 and ?̅?ℎ𝑤 are inversely associated with wages. 
If a worker is unable or unwilling to quit as their wages and conditions worsen, a monopsonistic 
profit-maximizing employer will cut wages more deeply, all else equal. If workers are more willing 
to quit as wages stagnate or fall, a monopsonistic employer will be forced to keep wages higher to 
maintain their profit-maximizing rate of employment. Moreover, as the wage decreases below 
MRP, the rate of exploitation increases mechanically. Thus, if all else equal, low-wage workers 
have a lower propensity to quit than high-wage workers under conditions of monopsony (?̅?𝑙𝑤 < 
?̅?ℎ𝑤), low-wage workers will be more highly exploited. The relevant question then becomes what 
structural frictions impede low-wage workers from quitting their jobs under conditions of 
monopsony.  
In the U.S., it is likely that such frictions stem the lack of an adequate social safety net along with 
the lower occupational and geographic mobility of low-wage workers. The lack of safety nets and 
adequate unemployment insurance, coupled with the well-publicized fact that the majority of low-
income American families lack adequate savings to pay for even an $400 emergency expense 
(Federal Reserve, 2018), mean that low-wage workers rarely have the resources to quit their job 
without another job offer close at hand. In high-monopsony labor markets, these new jobs will be 
few and far between. Moreover, this effect is amplified by the uniquely American system of 
employer-based health insurance, which leads most individuals who quit their jobs to be at least 
temporarily at risk of catastrophic financial burdens if they get sick. The relative lack of affordable 
high-quality postsecondary education in the United States means that it is hard for workers without 
the financial means to change occupations, particularly later in their careers, so they are effectively 
“hit harder” by existing levels of monopsony than those with more financial resources. And the 
geographic immobility of low-wage workers (e.g. Purcell, 2020, Rodgers and Rodgers, 2000) 
further magnifies this effect, making it more challenging for low-wage workers to escape high-
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monopsony labor markets and thus decreasing their quit rates and increasing their level of 
exploitation. If any of these observations are relevant to the decision-making of low-wage workers, 
the models of exploitation in equations (5) and (6) suggest that increased monopsony will also be 
associated with increased inequality. This model makes the additional prediction that much of this 
increase in inequality is caused by reduced wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution. In 
Section 5, we test these predictions and find them to be supported empirically. 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy  
This paper relies on a combination of data on monopsony power at the commuting zone-
occupation level (from Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum, and Taska, 2020) along with individual 
microdata on wages and demographic characteristics from the American Community Survey 
(ACS). Azar et al. use the near-universe of online job postings for the year 2016 collected by 
Burning Glass Technologies to construct measures of monopsony power for every occupation 
(occupations defined by BLS SOC code) and commuting zone pair throughout the United States. 
They calculate monopsony power using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market 
concentration, defined in market m and time t as  
 






                               (7)  
where sj,m represents the market share of firm j in market m (Azar et al., 2020). Crucially, the 
market share estimate sj,m is based on the number of vacancies, rather than total share of existing 
employment, of a particular firm in a particular market. The share of vacancies is arguably a better 
way to gauge the labor market faced by an individual worker than the share of total employment; 
a worker without available vacancies in their occupation and area effectively faces conditions of 
perfect monopsony, even if other firms employ a large share of workers but are not hiring new 
ones. The ACS data comes from the 2016 version of the American Community Survey; this data 
includes information on individual income from wages along with a variety of demographic 
characteristics. It also includes information on the occupation and county location of most 
individuals in the sample. I use the same crosswalk used by Azar et al. (2020) to convert from 
county to commuting zone, ensuring that my commuting zone definitions are identical to those in 
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the HHI data. I merge between the two datasets on the commuting zone-occupation level, using 
generalized (5-digit) SOC codes. See the Appendix for a discussion of why 5-digit SOC codes 
were preferred. I weight all analyses using the person-weights provided by ACS. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the workers remaining in the sample after initial processing. 
HHI normally ranges from 0 to 10,000 but is rescaled linearly to fall between 0 and 1 for ease of 
interpretation (e.g. an HHI of 2500 becomes a rescaled HHI of 0.25.) Note that the means of the 
HHI and wage distribution statistics are implicitly weighted by the number of people working in 
each CZ-SOC combination, hence why the average HHI here is much lower than the average HHI 
of 4,378 in Azar et al., who consider each CZ-SOC combination equally. While the majority of 
commuting zones exhibit very high market concentration, the majority of people live in commuting 
zones with low to moderate market concentration, since cities and suburbs tend to both be more 
densely populated and have lower levels of monopsony compared to rural areas. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 HHI, rescaled, SOC5 1,105,094 .223 .277 0 1 
 HHI, rescaled, SOC6 631,446 .098 .179 0 1 
 Wage income 1,011,863 40,175 57,404 0 714,000 
 Unemployed (1=yes) 985,447 .048 .214 0 1 
 Self-employed 
(1=yes) 
1,137,527 .088 .283 0 1 
 Top decile wage 691,871 97,273 76,168 18000 665,000 
 Median wage  691,871 45,299 29,719 1000 458,000 
 Bottom decile wage  691,871 16,305 13,050 1000 215,000 
 90/10 691,871 8.256 8.757 1 426 
 50/10 691,871 3.619 2.798 1 147.75 
 90/50 691,871 2.229 1.033 1 41.8 
Note: Top, median, and bottom decile wages, and ratios constructed from them, are 
calculated at the commuting zone-occupation level. I exclude all individuals who are 
unemployed or below age 18. When calculating ratios, any cz-occupation pair with less 
than 5 respondents in it is dropped. 
 
It is of some interest that there are both very low and extremely high interdecile ranges in the 
sample. A 90/10 ratio of 1 implies that wages are exactly the same between the top and bottom 
decile in that occupation-commuting zone combination, while a 90/10 ratio of 426 is clearly too 
high to accurately reflect the conditions faced by workers. Fortunately, the influence of these 
outliers is likely to be low. Only two interdecile ranges (out of 75,440 SOC5-CZ combinations) 
are equal to 1, while only 62 out of 75,440 are greater than 100. A wide variety of cutoffs (ranging 
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from 40 to 400) were used in preliminary analysis and did not influence the significance or 
direction of results. Because of this, I choose to keep the full sample rather than introducing an 
arbitrary cutoff for values that are “too high” or “too low.”  
My main regression specification is 
𝑦𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐 + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑐 is the variable of interest (either average wages or average interdecile range of wages 
𝑃90 𝑃10⁄ ) in occupation i and commuting zone c, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐 is the HHI in occupation i and commuting 
zone c, 𝑣𝑖 represents individual SOC fixed effects, 𝑣𝑐 represents individual commuting zone fixed 
effects, and X is a vector of controls for race, sex, and educational attainment. These controls 
measure the average values of each category at the CZ-SOC5 level. With the included occupation 
and commuting zone FE, this model effectively compares workers with the same occupation across 
commuting zones that have varying levels of employer concentration for that occupation. Or stated 
conversely, it compares workers in the same commuting zone who are in occupations with varying 
levels of employer concentration. The identification strategy employed would be stronger with 
multiple years of data, which would allow for three dimensions of variation in HHI, but data 
limitations prevent this; access to the full Burning Glass Technologies data is prohibitively 
expensive. However, the data available remains comprehensive and high-quality, and several 
previously published papers by Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum have used the same data from 
just 2016 to estimate the overall wage impacts of monopsony.  
5. Results 
While not the primary focus of the current paper, I begin by estimating effects on overall wages, 
which is useful for comparisons to the existing literature. Table 2 displays these results. All models 
for wage estimation include commuting zone and occupation fixed effects; columns 2 and 4 
include controls for race, education, and sex, and columns 3 and 4 only include full-time workers 
(those who work at least 40 hours a week and worked at least 40 weeks of the year.) These 
estimates of the effect of monopsony power on wages are similar to the existing literature. The 
coefficients on HHI are slightly larger in magnitude than Hershbein et al. (2019), and larger than 
Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim (2020) along with most of the estimates presented in the review 
of literature in Manning (2020). However, since these authors define monopsony power in terms 
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of absolute share of employment rather than vacancies, it is unsurprising that the results would be 
noticeably distinct. The results are more similar to those in Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum 
(2017), who use the same HHI data but wage data from online job postings. 
 
Table 2: The Effect of Monopsony Power on Overall Wages  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
HHI, rescaled -14327.95*** -12972.94*** -15805.35*** -13260.91*** 
 (348.83) (328.57) (385.21) (361.12) 
Constant 46411.64*** 44932.05*** 46710.66*** 45376.56*** 
 (1724.36) (1633.93) (1974.76) (1850.88) 
Commuting zone FE X X X X  
Occupation FE X X X X  
Race FE  X  X  
Education FE  X  X  
Sex FE  X  X  
Full-time workers 
only   X X  
N 719708 719708 568982 568982  
R-sq 0.137 0.247 0.144 0.262  
Note: The dependent variable is income from wages. Commuting zone and occupation FE are 
CZ and SOC5. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
The coefficients on HHI in all columns are very large in real terms: moving from a perfectly 
competitive labor market to a perfectly monopsonistic market is associated with a decrease in 
wages of over $12,900 in all specifications. If this sounds too extreme, note that the 90th percentile 
for rescaled HHI in this sample is just 0.39; markets with some degree of monopsony are 
widespread, but perfect monopsony is very rare. Moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of 
monopsony is associated with a 0.164-point increase in rescaled monopsony, and thus with a drop 
in wages of between $2,127 and $2,592 depending on the model used.  
The main results of the paper on monopsony and inequality are no less compelling. Results in all 
specifications are clear: increased monopsony power is associated with increased inequality, and 
these effects are large and highly statistically significant. My first set of results in Table 3 shows 
the effect of monopsony power on overall inequality as measured by the interdecile range of wages 
(𝑃90 𝑃10⁄ ). Since the rescaled HHI ranges from 0 to 1, the coefficients on HHI can be interpreted 
as the change in interdecile range associated with moving from a perfectly competitive to a 
9
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perfectly monopsonistic market. The results in column 1 include only commuting zone and 
occupation (5-digit SOC code) fixed effects, while column 2 adds controls for race, education, and 
sex. Column 3, my preferred specification, includes all sets of controls and fixed effects and 
excludes all part-time workers (defined as those who work less than 40 hours a week on average 
or who worked less than 40 weeks of the year.) The results for all three models are significant at 





The results from column 3 indicate that moving from a perfectly competitive to perfectly 
monopsonistic labor market is associated with a 1.956-point increase in interdecile range. The 
average interdecile range in this sample is 8.256, so this represents a 23.7% increase in inequality 
in perfectly monopsonistic labor markets, ceteris paribus. The specifications in models 1 and 2 
yield even higher estimates of the inequality effects of moving from competition to monopsony, 
27.6% and 27.7% respectively. Moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of HHI would be 
associated with an increase in interdecile range of between 3.9% and 4.5% depending on the 
preferred specification. These results are not just statistically significant; they are also 
meaningful in real terms. A 1.956-point increase in interdecile range looks roughly like moving 
Table 3: The Effect of Monopsony Power on Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
HHI, rescaled 2.2805*** 2.2861*** 1.9557*** 
 (0.5652) (0.5641) (0.4936) 
Constant 5.0948*** 4.8472*** 4.8614*** 
 (0.4967) (0.5036) (0.4858) 
    
Commuting zone FE X X X 
Occupation FE X X X 
Race FE  X X 
Education FE  X X 
Sex FE  X X 
Full-time workers only   X 
N 671959 671959 530624 
R-sq 0.190 0.191 0.192 
Note: The dependent variable in this regression is interdecile range, calculated as 
the ratio between the 90th percentile wage in the CZ-SOC5 pair and the 10th 
percentile wage in the same pair. All specifications exclude CZ-SOC5 pairs with 
fewer than 5 eligible workers.  Commuting zone and occupation FE are CZ and 
SOC5. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. 
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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from Canada (with an average interdecile range of 4.1, according to the World Bank) to the 
United States (with a range of 6.2). Consider a market where under perfect competition, the 
mean bottom decile wage in some labor market is $20,000 and the mean top decile wage is 
$100,000. In this case, moving from perfect competition to perfect monopsony without broader 
wage effects would mean wages for the top decile increasing to $139,120 without any rise in 
earnings at the bottom, or wages for the bottom decile falling to $14,376 without any decrease in 
earnings at the top. In either case, this is a dramatic spike in the gap between rich and poor.  
Of course, the real inequality effects of monopsony will be more complex and fall unevenly on 
different income groups. Fortunately, this can also be measured empirically. In Table 4, I 
specifically analyze upper and lower tail inequality by breaking the main measure of inequality 
into two partial ranges: the ratio between 50th and 10th percentile wages in a particular labor 
market, and the ratio between 90th and 50th percentile wages. Both models include commuting 












These results indicate that the increase in inequality due to monopsony is driven largely by a 
significant increase at the low end of the income distribution. Inequality between median earners 
Table 4: Inequality Decomposition 
 50/10 Ratio 90/50 Ratio 
HHI, rescaled 0.6200*** 0.1678* 
 (0.1708) (0.0742) 
Constant 2.0070*** 2.4054*** 
 (0.0906) (0.0540) 
   
Commuting zone FE X X 
Occupation FE X X 
Race FE X X 
Education FE X X 
Sex FE X X 
N 671959 671959 
R-sq 0.137 0.301 
Note: 50/10 and 90/50 ratios are calculated as the ratio 
between the given percentiles of the wage distribution for each 
CZ-SOC5 pair. All specifications use 5-digit generalized SOC 
codes and exclude pairs with fewer than 5 eligible workers. 
Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. 
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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and top earners increases slightly, but by a far smaller magnitude. In percentage terms, moving 
from perfect competition to perfect monopsony is associated with an increase of inequality of 17% 
between median earners and the bottom decile, and an increase of 7.5% between top and median 
earners, relative to the mean of each ratio. These findings are significant at the 0.1% level for the 
50/10 ratio, but only at the 5% level for the 90/50.  
This is identical to the result predicted by the model in section 3, which postulated that low-wage 
workers would be subject to a greater degree of exploitation as monopsony increases relative to 
their high-wage counterparts. The bulk of the empirical evidence shows that all employees in a 
monopsonistic labor market, including high- and medium-wage workers, suffer some degree of 
monopsony wage penalty, but these results provide evidence that low-wage workers are hit the 
hardest. Even if one does not see inequality as inherently undesirable, a 17% increase in the gap 
between the median worker and the bottom decile driven by wage decreases will clearly tend to 
lead to greater poverty and more reliance on social safety nets among low earners. This is a policy-
relevant effect, particularly given the magnitude of the change in inequality levels at the low end 
of the earnings distribution.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper documents the relationship between monopsony and inequality, adding to the limited 
literature on the topic by showing that labor markets with high monopsony power as measured in 
terms of vacancies tend to also exhibit higher inequality. I demonstrate that this increase is driven 
primarily by a drop in wages among the lowest-earning subset of the labor force, indicating that 
firms with a higher degree of labor market power have a greater tendency to exploit low-wage 
workers. These results also contribute to a parallel literature: the dramatic increase in wage 
inequality in the United States (e.g. Piketty, 2015) has occurred at the same time as a similarly 
dramatic increase in market concentration (e.g. Benmelech et al., 2020, Autor et al., 2020), and the 
results provide some evidence that these trends are causally connected.  
These results suggest that policymakers must make monopsony power a key consideration in any 
plan to address inequality in the United States. Historically, regulators have been far more 
concerned with concentration in the product market, rarely making judgements on the basis of 
labor market concentration or employee welfare. The inequality effects of monopsony, along with 
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its overall wage effects, make this an increasingly untenable standard. Regulators will need a set 
of analytic methods for judging the effects of mergers on labor markets; if used properly, they will 
create more efficient markets while also addressing a significant degree of exploitation and 
inequality in the United States. Azar et al. (2020) suggest that regulators might simply apply the 
same HHI standards to labor markets as they do in the product market, which would consider 
markets with an HHI above 2,500 to be highly concentrated and thus subject to additional scrutiny, 
while Naidu et al. (2018) propose more specific analytic methods. More research will certainly be 
produced to suggest better methods and standards, but it is important to take action quickly rather 
than waiting for the perfect answer, particularly in light of the historic collapse of small businesses 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. The results of this paper suggest that monopsonistic labor markets 
are characterized by an unnecessary degree of inefficiency and inequality, issues which are 
preventable if addressed at their source. Regulators and legislators should act to address the 
widespread and pervasive nature of monopsony in the United States; doing so is likely to reduce 
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Appendix: SOC Codes 
It was necessary to use generalized 5-digit SOC codes rather than the more specific 6-digit version 
in conducting analyses on this data. 5-digit SOC codes can be thought of as identical to the 
categories (ending in 0) listed on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website which defines SOC codes. 
For example, both 27-1022 (Fashion Designers) and 27-1025 (Interior Designers) would be 
counted under the category 27-1020 (Designers). This method necessarily loses some degree of 
specificity in the data, but attempting to use 6-digit codes would have systematically biased the 
results. In an attempt to anonymize responses as fully as possible, the ACS data cuts the last digit 
of occupation off of occupations that are relatively uncommon in their geographic area and 
replaces it with an X (e.g. displaying occupation as 27102X or 13115X).1 These represented almost 
40% of the sample, and were disproportionately located in rural and suburban areas where fewer 
people worked in each occupation. Simply dropping these would create a systematic bias in the 
sample towards more densely populated (and thus generally lower-monopsony) areas, and we 
observe this difference in Table 1. The mean rescaled HHI when using 5-digit SOC codes is 0.223, 
while with 6-digit codes the mean HHI is just 0.098.  
In order to address this source of bias, I used a weighted average of the HHI facing each 
subcategory in SOC6, weighted by the share of total employment, to calculate the HHI facing 
employees at the SOC5 level. This is the main measure of monopsony power used in analyses 
throughout the paper. It would be comforting to know that results are fundamentally similar when 
using the existing (albeit biased) SOC6 measures of inequality, and fortunately, that is the case. 
Table 3 displays the results of our main inequality specification using HHI data at the SOC6 level. 
Results are broadly similar; they have the same sign, similar magnitude, similar trend between 
models (Model 3 being the lowest under both the SOC5 and SOC6 measures). Results are 
statistically significant at the P<0.05 level in two of the three specifications and at the P<0.10 level 





1 A small number of occupation codes were shortened even further to 4 digits (e.g. 2710XX), but these represented 
less than 1% of the sample, were close to identical to the full sample on all dimensions of monopsony, and were 
dropped without much risk of bias.  
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While it would be preferable to see results which look identical to those in Table 3, these are 
nonetheless reassuring. Given the downward bias in HHI for the remaining sample, we might 
expect some degree of change in the effects, and the fact that these estimates are so similar means 







Table 5: SOC6 Measures of Inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
HHI, rescaled, SOC6 1.9836* 1.9753* 1.2565 
 (0.9130) (0.9122) (0.8426) 
Constant 5.3178*** 5.1834*** 5.1931*** 
 (0.4959) (0.5240) (0.5188) 
    
Commuting zone FE X X X 
Occupation FE X X X 
Race FE  X X 
Education FE  X X 
Sex FE  X X 
Full-time workers only   X 
N 436934 436934 349760 
R-sq 0.166 0.166 0.176 
Note: The dependent variable in this specification is interdecile range, 
calculated as the ratio between the 90th percentile wage in the CZ-SOC6 pair 
and the 10th percentile wage in the same pair. All specifications use 6-digit 
SOC codes, which may suffer from biases discussed previously, and exclude 
CZ-SOC6 pairs with fewer than 5 eligible workers. Commuting zone and 
occupation FE are CZ and SOC6.  
* p<0.05     
** p<0.01    
*** p<0.001  
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